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THE EQUITABLE LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS;
THE GROUNDS UPON WHICH IT RESTS.
Where creditors of a corporation seek to enforce the liability
of stockholders for the debts of the corporation, the first thing
to be determined is the nature of the liability; for upon that depends
not only the form of the remedy to be adopted and the course of
procedure to be pursued, but also whether the liability is enforce-
able in States other than that of the domicile of the corporation.
At common law a corporation is regarded as a person or entity
entirely distinct from its members, who are considered as mere
strangers so far as dealings between the corporation and third
parties are concerned. A creditor of the corporation can enforce
his claim only by proceeding against the corporation itself in an
action at law, and, after reducing his claim to a judgment, by
levying an execution on the property of the corporation.
It sometimes happens, however, that the only property which a
corporation has is of such a nature that it cannot be taken in
execution, as, for instance, where it consists of unpaid stock sub-
scriptions. So, also, by the strict rules of the common law, the
dissolution of a corporation works a total extinguishment of all
debts due to or from it; and, as the corporation has ceased to exist,
it cannot sue or be sued, and all its property becomes vested in
other parties, its real estate in the grantor or his heirs, and its
personal estate in the sovereign., In these and similar cases, there
being no remedy at law, on principles of its own, courts of equity
in this country will lay hold of such property at the suit of creditors
and apply it toward the payment of the debts of the corporation;
and the stockholders, therefore, to the extent of their indebtedness
to the corporation are said to be liable in equity for the debts of
the corporation. In modem times, moreover, the legislatures of
the several States, either in the charters granted to corporations,
or in general statutes, have provided that stockholders shall be
personally liable for the debts of the corporation to an extent
'Angell & Ames, Corp., sec. 779.
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varying in the different States. The liability of stockholders, there-
fore, is of two kinds, the Equitable Liability and the Statutory
Liability.
It is proposed in this article to consider the equitable liability
and the grounds upon which it rests.
The equitable liability arises from the fact that the stockholders
have in their hands assets of the corporation, and consists in an
obligation which courts of equity will enforce, to pay over to the
creditors for the corporation money- which they owe to the cor-
poration.1 Their liability, therefore, is limited to the amount of
corporate assets in their hands.
The general object of a bill brought by creditors of a corporation
against its stockholders is to obtain satisfaction of their claims
out of the corporate assets in the hands of the stockholders which
the corporation itself ought to have collected and applied to the
payment of its debts.
Courts of equity, in the exercise of their general jurisdiction,
entertain bills of this character usually on either one of two grounds:
irst, on the ground that the assets of the corporation constitute a
trust fund for the payment of its debts which the creditors seek
to have applied to the payment of the entire corporate indebtedness;
in other words, that the bills are brought to compel the execution
of a trust; or, second, on the ground that the corporate assets are
by reason of their nature incapable of being taken in execution
so that the creditors have no remedy at law; in other words, that
the bills are ordinary creditors' bills.2 These two classes of bills,
although they resemble each other in some respects, differ in several
important particulars. They are alike in that their general object
is to compel the application of corporate property in the hands of
stockholders to the payment of the corporate debts, and that as a
general rule they can be maintained only by judgment creditors
who have exhausted the remedies at law, and that as a general
rule the corporation is a necessary party. The particulars wherein
they differ are that where the bill is framed for the administration
of a trust fund, (i) all persons interested in the fund must be
"Patterson- v. Lynde, io6 U. S. 519.
2The first of these two classes of bills is illustrated by the cases of Wood
v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 3o8, and Handley v. Stutz, 137 U. S. 366; the second by
Ogilvie v. Knox Ins. Co., 22 How. U. S. 38o, and Marsh v. Burroughs, i
Woods, 463.
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made parties, creditors as well as stockholders, one or more cred-
itors, unless all are named, suing in behalf of all, whereas, in
the case of a creditors' bill one or more judgment creditors may
sue one or more stockholders; (2) the court proceeds in accord-
ance with its own rules to wind up the business of the corporation
by collecting all of its assets, ascertaining all of its creditors as
far as possible, adjusting the equities between the parties and
distributing the fund, whereas, in the case of a creditors' bill the
court generally only decrees payment of the complainants' claims
by such of the defendant stockholders as are found to be indebted
to the corporation, to the extent of their indebtedness.
The capital stock of a business corporation stands in the place
of, and is a substitute for, the individual responsibility of the
members which exists in co-partnerships. It is a fund created at
the time of the formation of the corporation for the purpose of
prosecuting the business of the corporation, and consists of the
money paid in or agreed to be paid in by the subscribers to the
stock, for the shares for which they subscribed. Persons dealing
with the corporation are presumed to understand the legal nature
and incidents of such a body politic and to contract with reference
to them,' to be aware of the immunity of its stockholders from
liability for its debts, and, in giving credit to the corporation, they
are presumed to rely solely for payment of their claims upon the
property of the corporation. The capital stock and property be-
long exclusively to the corporation but are held and employed
for the benefit of the stockholders who have contributed their
money for the purpose of thus having it held and employed for
their own profit. But the interest of the stockholders is only the
right to receive the dividends declared out of the profits and, upon
the dissolution of the corporation, their proportion of the corporate
property remaining after payment of the corporate debts. The
claims of creditors, therefore, upon the property of the corporation
are paramount to those of the stockholders and must be satisfied
before the latter are entitled to receive anything; and from these
considerations, principally, the American courts of equity have
deduced and formulated the doctrine that in equity the capital
stock and other property of a corporation, especially its unpaid
subscriptions, constitute a trust fund for the payment of the debts
of the corporation.
'Mumma v. The Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 281.
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The origin of the trust fund doctrine has by some been referred
to the case of Wood v. Dummer' decided by judge Story in 1824.
While that case may have been the first in which the doctrine was
judicially enounced and made the ground of decision and relief,
the theory was put forward five years earlier in two cases in the
Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts, Vose v. Grant,2 and
Spear v. Grant,3 decided in 1819, and cited by Judge Story in
Wood v. Dummer as supporting his views in that case. All three
of these cases grew out of the insolvency of the Hallowell and
Augusta Bank and the withdrawal by the stockholders of three-
fourths of the capital stock without leaving sufficient assets with
which to pay the outstanding bills of the bank.
In Vose v. Grant a bill-holder sued a stockholder who was also
a director in an action of trespass on the case as for a breach of
duty on the part of the defendant and the other directors and
stockholders in dividing three-fourths of the capital stock of the
bank among themselves without providing means for the payment
of the bills of the bank, the declaration alleging that the capital
stock was a fund for the payment of the bills of the bank and that
it was the duty of the defendant and other stockholders to preserve
such fund and provide means for the payment of the bills. One
ground which the plaintiff's counsel seems to have taken, according
to the report, was that the stockholders were liable for the mis-
application of the fund as trustees of the capital for the payment
of debts and then for the stockholders. It was held that the action
would not lie. In the course of the opinion of judge Jackson in
which he pointed out that the only remedy for the creditors was
in equity, he said: "At the time when the capital stock was divided
among the stockholders, it is obvious that the holders of their bills
had a better right to the money. The stockholders owned nothing
but the residue of the capital after payment of all the debts of
the bank." In Spear v. Grant the action was assumpsit, and it
was again held that the action would not lie, but that the remedy
was in equity. Chief justice Parker said that "the stock ought
undoubtedly to be considered as a pledge, as far as it will go, and
if withdrawn before the debts are discharged there would seem to
arise an equitable obligation on the part of the stockholders to





Then came the case of Wood v. Dummer, where some of the
bill-holders of the bank brought a bill in equity against some of
the stockholders to obtain payment of the bills out of the dividends
of the capital stock of the bank received by the defendants upon the
division of the stock among the stockholders. Judge Story in his
opinion followed the lines marked out by the Massachusetts court
ix 'Vose v. Grant and Spear v. Grant, and seems to have gone no
farther, except to expound the doctrine a little moie fully and to
designate the capital stock as a "trust fund" as well as a "pledge."
"It appears to me," said he, "very clear upon general principles,
as well as the legislative .intention, that the capital of banks is to be
deemed a pledge or trust fund for the payment of debts contracted
by the bank. The public, as well as the legislature, have always
supposed this to be a fund appropriated for such purpose. The
individual stockholders are not liable for the debts of the bank in
their private capacities. The charter relieves them from personal
responsibility, and substitutes the capital stock in its stead. Credit
is universally given to this fund by the public, as the only means
of repayment. During the existence of the corporation it is the
sole property of the corporation, and can be applied only according
to its charter, that is, as a fund for payment of its debts, upon the
security of which it may discount and circulate notes. Why, other-
wise, is any capital stock required by our charters? If the stock
may, the next day after it is paid in, be withdrawn without payment
of the debts of the corporation, why is its amount so studiously
provided for, and its payment by the stockholders so diligently
required? To me this point appears so plain upon principles of
law, as well as common sense, that I cannot be brought into any
doubt, that the charters of our banks make the capital stock a trust
fund for the payment of all the debts of the corporation. The bill-
holders and other creditors have the first claims upon it; and the
stockholders have no rights until all other creditors are satisfied.
* * * If the capital stock is a trust fund, then it may be fol-
lowed by the creditors into the hands of any persons, having notice
of the trust attaching to it. As to the stockholders themselves,
there can be no pretense to say that both in law and fact, they are
not affected with the most ample notice." The corporations which
the court had in mind were banks organized under the laws of
Massachusetts, but the principle laid down has been deemed equally
applicable to all business corporations.
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The trust fund doctrine as commonly formulated irn the proposi-
tion "the capital stock of a corporation is a trust fund for the
payment of its debts," has been criticised by some as inaccurate
and misleading and wholly unnecessary as a ground of jurisdiction
for the purpose of enabling a court of equity at the suit of creditors
to reach corporate assets in the hands of stockholders and apply
them to the payment of the corporate debts. But it has been ac-
cepted by the courts of this country with practical unanimity and.
has the emphatic approval of eminent judges and text-writers;1
and it has become so completely established as a general principle
in American equity and corporation law, that it is not to be lightly
and airily brushed aside as incorrect, confusing and useless. Its
terms may be susceptible of various definitions taken singly, but
the true meaning and scope of the proposition cannot be ascertained
by subjecting it to the test of a rigid definition by scholastic methods.
Considering the legal nature of a corporation, the relations which
the corporation, the stockholders and the creditors sustain to the
corporate property and to each other, the proposition seems to the
writer to be a convenient, concise and reasonably clear statement
of a general truth expressive of the existence of some special rights
on the part of the creditors on the one hand, and of corresponding
obligations on the part of the corporation on the other, in respect
of some specific corporate property, which rights and obligations
are recognized and enforced by courts of equity but not ordinarily
by courts of law. The term "trust fund" is not meant to oonvey
the idea that there is an express, technical trust, implying the ex-
istence of two estates, the legal title to the property in the corpora-
tion as trustee and the beneficial ownership thereof in the creditors,
as cestuis que trust. The word "trust" is often used in a very
broad and comprehensive sense, and is applied to a great variety
of cases where one person holds property which he is bound to
apply for the benefit of another, qs an executor, administrator, sur-
viving partner and agent.
Trusts which arise by operation of law form an important part
of the general law of trusts. Of this class are constructive trusts,
in the broad sense of the term,--those trusts which courts of equity
raise or create for the purpose of protecting and establishing rights
and enforcing obligations in respect of some particular property
by means of those efficient remedies which they apply in cases
12 Kent, Com. *3o7, n (b) ; Angell & Ames, Corp., sec. 779 a.
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where similar rights and obligations arise from express trusts.1
These rights and obligations may arise iri various ways, from con-
tract or from fraud; they may be created by statute or by the
common law; or they may owe their existence entirely to the
doctrines of equity. In these cases the nature and extent of the
trust are measured by the nature and extent of the rights and
obligations.
In building up this remedial system of constructive trusts,
courts of equity went a step further in applying the theory of a
trust to cases which were not trusts, and invented or borrowed
from the Roman law the doctrine of equitable liens. The cestui
que trust under an express trust has an estate or interest in the
property which is the subject of the trust. He is in equity deemed
to be the true owner, and by virtue of that ownership may follow
the property and assert his right therein against all persons into
whose hands it may come except bona fide purchasers for value
and without notice. In some cases which come within the class
of constructive trusts, a party is considered as having an equitable
estate in the property, either as the result of a contract relating to
the property, or as the result of fraud in its acquisition by another.
There are, however, other transactions relating to property where
personal obligations (usually the payment of money) on the part
of one party are incurred, but no interest or estate in the property
is created in the other party, or in the party to be benefited by a
performance of the obligations, and where, from the nature of the
transaction, equity considers that such other party ought, in right
and justice, to have a right of priority of payment out of the prop-
erty over general creditors, and to follow it into the hands of any
other person not a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice,
and to subject it to the satisfaction of his claim.
The doctrine of "equitable liens" afforded courts of equity a
ground on which to proceed in cases of this sort consistently with
the principles of equitable jurisdiction. An equitable lien, although
it is neither a right in a thing-ownership or property, nor a right
to recover possession of it,-neither jus in re nor jus ad rem-is,
nevertheless, a valuable right in the nature of property analogous
to the right of a mortgagee in equity. It has been defined to be "a
right not recognized at law, to have a fund or specific property or
'I Spence, Eq. Jurisd., *511; Hill, Trustees, *144, *171; Snell, Principles
of Eq. (3d ed.), lO9.
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its proceeds applied in whole or in part, to the payment of a partic-
ular debt or class of debts."1  The relations existing between the
party in whose favor the lien exists and the owner of the property
resemble those existing between the cestui que trust and the trustee
in an express trust, and from time immemorial equitable liens have
been regarded as belonging to the class of constructive trusts, the
legal owner of the property being a trustee for the creditor to the
extent of the lien.
2
In view of the legal nature and incidents of a business corpo-
ration and the relative rights and duties of the corporation, its
stockholders and its creditors, as established by judicial decisions,
the trust fund doctrine is perfectly consistent with the theory on
which courts of equity exercise jurisdiction in cases of implied
trusts, and it is difficult to see how it is any more misleading and
confusing than are other principles and doctrines of the law, the
existence of which is not questioned, but the application of which
in particular cases occasions some diversity of judicial opinion.
Corporations created for the purpose of carrying on business
for pecuniary profit are required to establish a fund, called the
capital stock, of a fixed amount, which is divided into shares and
is obtained by subscriptions for the shares. At the inception of
the corporation the subscribers become severally bound by a con-
tract with it to pay the amount of the par value of the shares for
which they have severally subscribed. The subscribers thereupon
become stockholders and the aggregate amount of their subscrip-
tions paid in or agreed to be paid in constitutes the capital stock of
the corporation in the proper sense of that term.8 It is a fund
created for the purpose of prosecuting the enterprise for which
the corporation was formed, such as buying property, paying for
labor and services, and especially for paying the debts and liabilities
of the corporation. Indeed, it may be said that the fund is estab-
lished for the sole purpose of being held as a security for the
debts of the corporation to be applied to the satisfaction thereof in
the event of the insolvency or dissolution of the corporation. The
stockholders not being individually liable for the corporate debts,
creditors- can look only to the corporate property for the payment
'13 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, p. 6o8.
'Pom. Eq. Jur., secs. 165, 1,234; Story, Eq. Jur., sec. 1,244; Hovey v.
Elliott, 118 N. Y. 124.
'Cook, Corp., sec. 9; 2 Clark & Marshall, Priv. Corp., sec. 375.
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of their claims. For this reason the capital stock is established
at a fixed amount and required to be maintained intact, and, as was
said by Parker, C. I., in Spear v. Grant, supra, "ought to be con-
sidered as a pledge." It cannot rightfully be withdrawn or dimin-
ished, or be used for any other purposes than such as are authorized
by the charter, or parted with except for a valuable consideration,
nor can the liability for stock subscriptions be released or cancelled
or evaded by any simulated payment of such subscription or by
any device short of actual payment in good faith. When debts
are incurred, a contract at once arises with the creditors that the
fund shall not be withdrawn or applied otherwise than upon their
demands until such demands are satisfied. The creditors have a
lien upon it in equity, and if diverted they may follow it as far as
it can be traced, and subject it to the payment of their claims, except
as against holders who have taken it bona fide for a valuable con-
sideration and without notice.1
When the capital stock has been paid in and converted into
other forms.of property, then such property and the earnings, if
any, derived from the business, all the assets of the corporation, to
the extent of the amount of the capital stock, represent, and to all
intents and purposes, constitute, the capital stock. If a part only of
the subscriptions has been paid in, then the unpaid subscriptions
together with all other corporate property to the extent of the
balance of the amount of the capital stock constitute the capital
stock. In short, the capital stock is a fund of a fixed amount and
of permanent duration, whether it remains in its original form or
has been converted into or invested in other property. Such being
the nature of the capital stock and the rights and obligations of
the corporation, the stockholders and the creditors in relation thereto,
when the corporation becomes insolvent and the creditors have ex-
hausted their remedies at law without obtaining satisfaction of their
claims and a portion of the capital stock is in the hands of the
stockholders in the form of unpaid subscriptions which cannot be
reached by execution, it would seem to be in accordance with the
principles and practice of courts of equity, in order to afford a
remedy, to resort to the doctrine of equitable liens and the theory
of trusts, as they have done in many other instances of constructive
'Curran v. State of Arkansas, I5 How. 304; New Albany v. Burke, ii
Wall. 96; Burke v. Smith, 16 Wall. 39o; Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 61o;
Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45; Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56; Camden v.
Stuart. 144 U. S. 1o4; Por. Eq. fur., sec. 1,046.
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trusts, and enforce the lien by laying hold of the fund. and applying
it to the purposes for which it was originally established. Espe-
cially would this be so where the corporation has been dissolved
leaving debts and assets.-
There is a marked distinction in the books between a case where
one takes property subject to a charge for the payment of debts or
other charges in favor of third persons, and a case where one takes
property in trust to pay the debts or charges. In the former case
the holder of the property has the entire legal and beneficial interest
in it subject only to the payment of the debts or other charges; in the
latter case there is an express, direct trust to pay the debts or
charges, the holder of the property having the legal title to it, while
the beneficial interest is in the creditors or parties in whose favor
the charge is created as cestuis que trust.2
Referring to cases of the former kind, where the holder of the
property has the entire legal and beneficial interest in it subject to
a charge only, Judge Story says: "In such cases, although the
charge is treated, as between the immediate parties to the original
instrument, as an express trust in the property, which may be
enforced by such parties or their proper representatives; yet, as
between the trustee and the cestuis que trst, who are to take the
benefits of the instrument, it constitutes an implied or constructive
trust only; a trust raised by courts of equity in their favor, as an
interest in rem, capable of being enforced by them directly by a suit
brought in their own names and right.'
The capital stock of a corporation, although it is a fund estab-
lished for the prosecution of the corporate business and owned
exclusively by the corporation, is a "trust fund" for creditors in
the sense that it is subject to a charge in favor of creditors for the
payment of debts in the event of the insolvency or dissolution of
'Story, Eq. Jur., sec. 1,252; Snell, Principles of Eq. (3d ed.), iog. Mr.
Pomeroy has clearly shown how the theory of trusts, the notion of double
ownership, has been extended by courts of equity to cases analogous to
actual trusts, and thus given rise to that large class of cases called trusts
arising by operation of law, such as thi administration of estates of deceased
persons, fiduciary relations, mortgages, equitable liens, etc., in which the use
of the terms "trust," "trustee" and "trust fund" is as common and well
established as the cases in which they are applied; and, it may be added,
their meaning as well understood. Pom. Eq. Jur., secs. 147, 6.9.
'King v. Denison, i Ves. & Beam. 273; Pom. Eq. Jur., see. i,24; Story,
Eq. Jur., secs. 1,244, 1,245.
'Story, Eq. Jut., sec. i,244.
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the corporation. The trust consists in the obligation on the part of
the corporation to preserve the fund, to do nothing that will destroy
or diminish it to the end that it may be forthcoming upon the in-
solvency or dissolution of the corporation and applied to the pay-
ment of the corporate debts. Although the corporation has the
use of the fund for the purpose of carrying on its business, yet, as
it cannot rightfully pay it away without a valuable consideration,
and every expenditure is made presumably in accordance with its
charter and the law and for an equivalent in value in some form,
as for property purchased, or for labor or services by which the
value of the property is enhanced or profits are made, the fund,
the capital stock, is not diminished but remains for the security of
creditors until the insolvency or dissolution of the corporation en-
titles the creditors to have it applied to the payment of their claims.
The debts secured by the charge on the capital stock of the
corporation are the debts of the corporation itself (the trustee).
There being privity of contract between it and the creditors, the
relations existing between them are those, merely, of debtor and
creditor, so that for the collection of their claims the creditors have
open to them all the ordinary remedies afforded by the courts of
common law, and, as in the case of claims against natural persons,
the creditors are bound to exhaust their legal remedies against the
corporation before they can come into equity for assistance. Ob-
taining a judgment at law on his claim and the return of an execution
unsatisfied have always been necessary steps for a creditor to pursue
before a court of equity would interfere in his behalf to enable him
to obtain satisfaction of his claim out of his debtor's property which
could not be reached by ordinary legal process. They establish the
validity and amount of his claim and make his lien complete and
ripe for enforcement, and a bill in equity by a creditor against the
stockholders to reach the corporate assets in their hands is in effect
a proceeding in rem, to enforce his charge or lien upon the capital
stock. In compelling stockholders to account for unpaid subscrip-
tions in such a suit, the court will. give effect to the rights of cred-
itors and enforce the obligations of the corporation to preserve
and protect the capital stock for the benefit of creditors, by inquiring
into the validity of past transactions between the corporations and
the stockholders respecting the subscriptions as far back even as
the making of the contract of subscription, and avoid all arrange-
ments, contracts, releases and things done in violation of the princi-
ple that the capital stock is a trust fund for the benefit of the
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creditors. "Unpaid subscriptions are assets," says Chief Justice
Fuller, in Hawkins v. Glenn, 1 "but have frequently been treated by
courts of equity as if impressed with a trust sub modo, upon the
view that the corporation being insolvent the existence of creditors
subjects these liabilities to the rules applicable to funds to be ac-
counted for- as held in- trust."
It has been objected, however, that the trust fund theory is
unnecessary as a ground of jurisdiction in such cases in order to
reach unpaid subscriptions, since a bill could be maintained on
the ground of fraud and that particular phase of fraud which con-
sists of a virtual misrepresentation of a fact, namely, that the capital
stock has all been paid in, whereby the creditors have been induced
to give credit to their injury, a case where equity will compel the
offending party to make good his representations. There is no
doubt that in most cases which contain the element of fraud a court
of equity will entertain a bill for relief on that ground alone. But
the difficulty is that in many instances of creditors' suits against
stockholders there is no fraud whatever on the part of the stock-
holders even in the broad sense in which fraud is understood in
equity. Corporations are not always required to have all their
capital stock actually paid in before they can transact business.
Unless otherwise provided in their charters- or by general statutes
they may, and generally do, if the full amount of the capital stock
has been subscribed and thus secured by a valid contract, commence
business and call in the capital as it may be required. In such
cases, there being no obligation to pay in the capital, at least until
calls have been made, there can be no implied representation made
by the stockholders that they have paid the full amount of their
subscriptions, nor any implied representation by the corporation that
the capital stock has been all paid in; and it would be stretching
"equitable fraud" a little too much to impute fraud to stockholders
who have become such by a transfer of shares after the debts have
been contracted.2
The legal nature of a corporation and the relations existing
between it and its stockholders and creditors are the same in equity
as at law. The corporation is in equity as at law an entity or
person entirely distinct from the stockholders. It is the sole owner,
131 U. S. 319.
'See XII Yale Law Journal, 63, December, x9o2, where the objections
to the fraud theory were clearly stated.
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legal and equitable, of its property. If the stockholders owe any
part of their subscriptions they are debtors to the corporation to
the extent of the amount unpaid for which they may be sued by
the corporation in an action at law. The consequences of a dis-
solution of a corporation are also the same at law and in equity.
But just at the point where the powers of the courts of common law
cease, where their forms of action and processes can furnish no
remedy against either persons or things, equity steps in, and by
giving effect to rights and obligations unknown to the common law,
by its own flexible remedies, lays hold of the fund itself, in the
familiar and expressive language of equity lawyers, and applies it
to the discharge of obligations by which it is bound, as if (quasi)
there was a trust.
In Wood v. Dumtner, supra, the corporation had ceased to exist
by the expiration of the time limited by its charter, and it was
expressly stated by the court that there was no evidence whatever
of fraud in the case. Hence, the title of the complainants to relief
was put upon the ground "that the defendants held a trust fund
applicable to the payment of the debts of the corporation." The
bill was brought by some of the creditors against some of the stock-
holders, not by the plaintiffs in behalf of themselves and all other
creditors, and contained no averment excusing the omission of cred-
itors and stockholders not made parties. The relief prayed for was
that the plaintiffs might be "reimbursed by the defendants out of
the dividends of the capital stock received by them, the amount of
the debts so due to the plaintiffs respectively for the bank notes
above stated." Judge Story, however, treated the bill as being
one where the whole fund was before the court for distribution
among all the creditors, and where, although all interested in the
fund, the corporation (if in existence) as well as the stockholders
and creditors, should be made parties, they were too numerous for
all to be so made and some of them might be dispensed with, and
the court could do equity to those before it without prejudice to
the rights of those not represented.'
There is some apparent confusion in the decisions in regard to
the grounds on which creditors' bills against stockholders are main-
tainable as well as in regard to the frame of the bill, the necessary
parties and the necessary allegations. This seems to arise from not
observing or bringing out clearly the distinction before mentioned
'Story, Eq. P1., sees. iIg, io.
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between the two classes of bills, namely, those grounded on the
trust fund theory which seek to have the whole fund distributed
among those entitled to it, and ordinary creditors' bills which merely
ask to have debts due from the defendants to the corporation applied
to the payment of the debt due from the corporation to the plaintiff;
and it must be confessed that in cases of the latter kind courts have
frequently proceeded on the ground that assets sought to be reached
were a trust fund for creditors.
Where the object of the bill is to have the whole fund distributed
among the creditors the fundamental rule of pleading requires that
all persons who are interested in the fund or whose rights may
be affected by the decree should be made parties. The bill, there-
fore, must be brought by all of the creditors, or by one or more
in behalf of all.1 As to the stockholders it would seem on principle
that all should be made parties, or their omission excused by proper
averments, as that they are insolvent or out of the jurisdiction of
the court.
2
In Hatch v. Dana,8 Mr. Justice Strong, speaking for the court,
said: "It may be that if the object of the bill is to wind up the
affairs of this corporation, all the shareholders, at least so far as
they can be ascertained, should be made parties, that complete justice
may be done by equalizing the burdens, and in order to prevent a
multiplicity of suits." The corporation, if in existence, is a proper
party, but whether a necessary party or not there is diversity of
opinion, some holding that where it is hopelessly and notoriously
insolvent, and that fact is alleged in the bill, it need not be joined;
others, that it should be a party because it is the owner of the prop-
erty. The bill should allege, or at least it should be made to appear
from facts which are alleged, that the plaintiffs are judgment cred-
itors who have exhausted their legal remedies by executions returned
.unsatisfied. This requirement has few exceptions, since the judg-
ments establish the validity and amount of the debts and the return
of the executions shows the existence of facts necessary to give the
court jurisdiction. So also it must appear by the bill that the unpaid
subscriptions are a trust fund in the hands of the defendants ap-
plicable to the payment of the debts of the corporation. In Wood v.
- Dummer, Judge Story said, referring to the loose manner in which
the bill was drawn: "It does not directly proceed upon the ground
'Handley v. Stutz, 137 U. S. 366.
'Wood v. Dumrner, supra.
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that the defendants hold a trust fund applicable to the payment of
the debts of the corporation; but leaves this to be picked up in
fragments by a minute analysis of the bill." And again: It "does
not charge that the capital stock is a trust fund appropriated by
law and the charter to the payment of the debts, and that the surplus
only, after such payment, belongs to the stockholders. Such an
allegation was most fit to have been made upon the grounds on
which ultimately the plaintiffs concluded to rest their case at the
hearing. The court is therefore compelled to thread it out by in-
ference and intendment and exposition of the charter, as made part
of the pleadings."' So also it must be made to appear that the
corporation is insolvent, or that it is dissolved, and that there is
no other property out of which the debts can be paid.
An ordinary creditors' bill may be brought by one or more judg-
ment creditors for their own benefit, or by one or more in behalf
of themselves and all other creditors against one or more stock-
holders, 2 and generally the corporation is a necessary party. It
must be alleged that the plaintiffs are judgment creditors and that
executions on their judgments have been returned unsatisfied.
In many of the cases of this sort, as above intimated, although
the bills are brought by one or more creditors for their own benefit
exclusively against one or more stockholders, and ask for payment
of their debts alone, they set out and claim that the unpaid sub-
scriptions are a trust fund for the payment of the debts of the
corporation, and the courts in their opinions and decisions seem
frequently to go upon that theory as though the existence of a
trust was necessary in order to give them jurisdiction and enable
them to grant relief. Marsh v. Burroughs,3 is an example. The
bill charged that the unpaid subscriptions constitute a trust fund
and prayed that it might be so decreed and might be applied to the
payment of the plaintiffs' claims. The court appears to have sus-
tained the bill as framed on the ground that the unpaid stock sub-
scriptions were a trust fund. On the other hand, in Ogilvie v.
Knox Ins. Co.,4 the bill was filed by certain judgment creditors in
behalf of themselves and such other creditors as might make them-
selves parties against the corporation and some of the stockholders.
It alleged that the complainants had recovered judgments against
'See also Handley v. Stutz, supra.




the company on which executions had been returned unsatisfied
and that the defendants other than the company severally subscribed
for stock in the company and were still indebted for it, payment not
having been enforced by the company. The prayer was that the
defendant stockholders might be decreed to pay their subscriptions
and that the judgments might be satisfied from the fund thus
produced. The court proceeded solely upon the theory upon which
the bill was framed, namely, that the defendant stockholders were
debtors to the company for the several amounts due by each for
unpaid subscriptions. Mr. Justice Grier, writing the opinion of the
court says: "This bill is filed to compel these stockholders or debt-
ors to the corporation to pay the amount of their debts, in order
that the creditors of the company may obtain satisfaction." And
again: "As stockholders who have not paid in the whole amount
of the stock subscribed and owned by them, they (the defendant
stockholders) stand in the relation of debtors to the corporation for
the several amounts due by each of them. As to them, this bill
is in the nature of an attachment, in which they are called in to
answer as garnishees of the principal debtor."
In Hatch v. Dana,1 although the bill in that case has been said
to be a bill for the administration of a trust fund for the benefit of
all the creditors,2 nevertheless the court emphatically called it "an
ordinary creditors' bill, the sole object of which is to obtain payment
of the complainant's judgment," declaring that it was not a bill
seeking to wind up the company, and proceeded on the ground
that the defendants' unpaid subscriptions were merely debts due
to the corporation which a judgment creditor could reach by a cred-
itor's bill, taking the same view that the court took in Ogilvie v.
Knox Its. Co., supra. "By his subscription," says Mr. Justice
Strong, "each [subscriber to the capital stock] becomes a several
debtor to the company, as much so as if he had given his promissory
note for the amount of his subscription. At law, certainly, his
subscription may be enforced against him without joinder of other
subscribers; and in equity his liability does not cease to be several.
A creditor's bill merely subrogates the creditor to the place of the
debtor, and garnishes the debt due to the indebted corporation. It
does not change the character of the debt attached or garnished."
Perhaps the reason why ordinary creditors' bills are so often
found to contain averments of a trust is that formerly, and until a
101 U. S. 205.
'Haudley v. Stutz, supra.
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recent period, it was a vexed question whether an ordinary creditors'
bill could be maintained to reach choses in action unless it showed
fraud or a trust or some recognized ground of equitable jurisdiction
other than the absence of any remedy at law.1 The view that such
a bill will not lie unless fraud or a trust is shown is maintained by
some courts to-day,2 although it is generally held that such a bill
will lie on the ground of the inability of the courts of common law
to afford a remedy by which a debtor's property of an intangible
nature, such as choses in action, can be reached and subjected to
the payment of his debts.3 It some jurisdictions, therefore, it
might have been, and may be still, necessary or prudent in ordinary
creditors' suits to adopt the trust fund theory in framing the bill
and to aver or set out in substance the existence of the trust.
The Supreme Court of the United States has emphatically de-
clared that the unpaid subscriptions to the capital stock of a
corporation are a trust fund for the benefit of all the creditors
equally, and cannot be appropriated by any one creditor exclusively
to himself, and that for that reason no stockholder in a suit by or
in behalf of all the creditors to enforce his subscription liability
has a right to set off against that liability an ordinary debt of the
corporation, and no creditor of a corporation can maintain an action
at law against any stockholder on his subscription liability, to recover
the debt due to him from the corporation.4 In view of these de-
cisions there seems to be an inconsistency in permitting a single
creditor, by bringing an ordinary creditors' bill for his own benefit
exclusively, actually to obtain a preference over other creditors,
especially where the bill shows upon its face that the money which
the plaintiff seeks to have applied to the payment of his claim is
unpaid subscription money and a trust fund for all the creditors
equally.
The inconsistency, however, is apparent rather than real. The
general rule undoubtedly is that all persons materially interested in
the subject-matter of a suit, such, for instance, as a particular fund
for the payment of debts or legacies, ought to be made parties, to
the end that no injustice will be done by the decree to absent parties;
and on a bill filed by a single creditor of a corporation against stock-
12 Kent, Com., 442, 443.
'Greene v. Keene, 14 R. I. 338.
'Por. Eq. Jur., sec. 1,415, and the modern text books on equity.
"Sawyer v. Haag, 17 Wall. 6io; Sco'ville v. Thayer, io5 U. S. 143; Pat-
terson v. Lynde, io6 U. S. 5ig.
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holders to obtain payment of his own debt only, the court will not
decree payment of the debt if it appears that there are persons other
than the plaintiff who have claims upon the fund, and that the
fund is or may be insufficient for the payment in full of all having
claims upon it, but on the contrary will frame the decree so that
all of the creditors may come in and share in the distribution of
the fund.
The practice, however, seems to be for the court to presume in
case of such a bill, unless the contrary appears affirmatively on the
bill, answer, or proofs, that there are no other creditors, or if there
might be some, that there will be no deficiency of assets.-
In Marsh v. Burroughs this very matter was discussed by the
court. Mr. Justice Bradley said: "When a case exists in which
a fund can only be divided satisfactorily among a certain class, it
is necessary to frame the decree in such a manner as that all those
persons may be brought in for their distributive shares; but even
then, the bill may often be filed by any one of them on his own
behalf. It is only when it appears to the court by the subsequent
pleadings, or otherwise, that a distribution must be made (as when
an executor pleads want of sufficient assets) that a decree will be
made for the benefit of all."
It was the purpose of the writer to conclude this paper by taking
up a few illustrative cases, especially those decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States, involving questions touching the equitable
liability of stockholders, with a view of ascertaining, if possible, the
extent of that liability, or, more accurately perhaps, when or under
what circumstances short of actual payment in full for stock is no
liability incurred, or if incurred, does the liability cease, or do the
courts refuse to enforce it against stockholders. But this article has
already reached, if it has not exceeded, its just limits, and such a re-
view of the cases must be reserved for some other occasion. It seems
proper, however, in closing, to observe that in a majority of the cases
the creditors sue the stockholders on their subscription liability, a
liability which is attached to the stock and follows it into whosesoever
hands it may go, and that in such suits a defendant stockholder may
be an original subscriber to the stock who has not paid for it, or he
may be a remote purchaser or transferree of the stock who bought
it in good faith and for fair value. These considerations suggest
"Story, Eq. P., secs. 99, ioo, and notes; Hallett v. Hallett, 2 Paige, 15;
Marsh v. Burroughs, v Woods, 463.
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the extent of the liability and the lines upon which an examination
of the cases might be directed; and the following extract from the
opinion of the court in the case of Camden v. Stuart,' may fitly
conclude this article:
"It is the settled doctrine of this court that the trust arising in
favor of creditors by subscriptions to the stock of a corporation,
cannot be defeated by a simulated payment of such subscriptions,
nor by any device short of an actual payment in good faith. And
while any settlement or satisfaction of such subscription may be
good as between the corporation and the stockholders, it is un-
availing as against the claims of the creditors. Nothing that was
said in the recent cases of Clark v. Bever, 139 U. S. 96; Fogg v.
Blair, 139 U. S. 118; or Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417, was
intended to overrule or qualify in any way the wholesome principle
adopted by this court in the earlier cases, especially as applied to
the original subscribers to stock. The later cases only intended to
draw a line beyond which the court was unwilling to go in affixing
a liability upon those who had purchased stock of the corporation,
or had taken it in good faith in satisfaction of their demands."
George B. Barrows.
Providence, R. I., September, 19o3.
1 144 U. S. 104, 113.
